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Kaarlo Tuori’s and Klaus Tuori’s account of the the Eurozone crisis is an excellent
analysis of all of its major constitutional issues. In the first chapters, the authors set
the field in all necessary detail, embedding constitutional history in its economic
context. They strongly focus on the distinction between two layers of Europe’s
economic constitution, the microeconomic (laid down in the Treaty of Rome,
and developed by the ECJ) on the one hand, and the macroeconomic layer
(introduced with the Maastricht treaty) on the other hand. They correctly depict the
macroeconomic constitution as a logical development of the microeconomic one
by showing how the two concepts are intertwined, but also by elaborating on their
differences and incoherencies, in particular with regard to changing macroeconomic
premises over time. In their subsequent analysis of the Eurozone crisis, a moment
in which the premises of the macroeconomic constitution have been heavily shaken,
the distinction between the micro- and the macroeconomic is valuable to understand
the limits of the solutions that have been adopted to tame the effects of the crisis
when scrutinized from a broader constitutional perspective.
Having set the field, the authors explain the single crisis measures that have been
taken on both, the institutional and the intergovernmental levels, without neglecting
the particular role of the ECB, presenting the debates that surrounded them and
assessing them in the light of the Pringle decision of the ECJ as well as, even though
at a later stage of the book, in the light of national constitutional courts’ decisions.
More interestingly, they show how the macroeconomic constitution has been
realigned as a response to the crisis, in particular how the principle financial stability
now is understood more broadly than the Maastricht principle of price stability,
how the Maastricht principles of Member States’ fiscal responsibility and fiscal and
economic coordination have been altered and how the principle of unity has been
weakened, in particular through the Pringle decision allowing for intergovernmental
solutions.
In the last part of the book, the authors relate the – to a certain extent technical –
legal analysis of the Eurocrisis and its containment measures to broader issues of
democracy and social rights. They give an outline of the democracy and legitimacy
questions that have been raised, such as Habermas’ claim that the crisis reaction
institutes a form of ‘executive federalism’, the problem of technocratic government
(‘expert bodies’) or (German) debates on a ‘state of exception’. While these issues
are not at the heart of their analysis, they carve out the dilemma between the lack
of democratic legitimacy of the crisis measures on one hand and social and cultural
developments not being ripe for strengthening democracy on a transnational or
rather European level very well. They continue by discussing the difficult role of
social rights in the European integration process, both in terms of the micro- as
well as the macroeconomic constitution. With regard to the latter, they point to
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the ‘economist’ versus ‘monetarist’ debate at the origin of the EMU and how the
negligence of the economic pillar as compared to the monetary pillar led to a lack
of political or fiscal integration. Competence for fiscal policy with its redistributive
function fostering social rights was not transferred to the European level which
is why ultimately, social rights remained underdeveloped. Even though the crisis
and the realignment of the Maastricht principles could have been an opportunity to
put a stronger focus on them, it was, if at all, only marginally seized. Finally, they
conclude with a rather pessimistic outlook, expressing a general preference for
the EU’s legislative and institutional framework to be further developed rather than
intergovernmental solutions being sought.
The authors have undertaken a highly topical and thorough analysis with broad
references to EU constitutional law and economic foundations. Their elaboration on
the different layers of Europe’s economic constitution is well argued and thought-
through. I do, however, disagree with their pessimistic conclusion and in particular
with their tendency to reject intergovernmentalism as a means towards further
realignment of the macroeconomic principles and towards overall development of
the European legal and institutional setting. In my view, the distinction between
intergovernmental and institutional, with the former being regarded as inferior given
the overall level of integration achieved at the Union level, is misleading. In absence
of a European democratic process, intergovernmentalism has one feature that must
not be neglected, namely that it constitutes a political process ideally leading to
the democratic legitimation of norms. The authors do recognize this while arguing
that what has emerged as intergovernmentalism in response to the crisis does not
fulfill the two conditions necessary for contributing to democratic legitimation. These
conditions are that “[f]irst, executive participation in European policy-making should
be subjected to constant supervision by national parliaments and civil societies. And
second, bearing in mind the complementary nature of Europe-wide and national
democratic procedures, intergovernmentalism and related intermediated legitimation
should contribute to rather than destroy socio-cultural prerequisites for European
democracy.” (at 218) The authors are surely right to criticize the particular form
of intergovernmentalism that has emerged, where decisions have been taken
by the executives on national and European levels or delegated to technical
bodies, while national parliaments were reduced to, cynically put, theatre. Yet, I do
believe that the national legislative process – as troublesome as it might be – is an
essential counterweight to expert-dominated policy-making on the European level.
Mechanisms to strengthen the role of parliament in the decision-making process
of the executive have been developed in the course of the Eurocrisis, such as, for
example, through a constitutional amendment in Austria subjecting the decisions
made by the Austrian member of the ESM’s Board of Governors to parliamentary
control. I share the authors’ doubts about having reached a level of integration at
which a Habermasian vision of transnational, pan-European democracy could be
achieved. However, I am a little more optimistic about what the crisis has taught us
about the political dimension of European integration, be it only by raising awareness
about its underdevelopment. An interesting question to pursue now would be how
the elements giving the national legislative process democratic legitimacy could
be integrated into European decision making. A thought-provoking proposal for
such integration recently has been made in response to ideas developed by the
- 2 -
Glienicker Gruppe by a group of French economists, who suggest the creation of a
second chamber of the European parliament consisting of delegates from national
parliaments. With reference to the book’s distinction between the microeconomic
and the macroeconomic layers of the European economic constitution, I dare to
conclude that while we have accepted that the development of the  European
microeconomic constitution to a large extent has been driven by the ECJ, we have
to accept that the realignment of the principles of the macroeconomic constitution
as has become necessary in the course of the crisis is so far-reaching that we
should seek to develop ‘intermediated legitimation’, even if it comes in the form of
intergovernmentalism. Today, intergovernmentalism is the best form of legitimation
we have at our disposal. To be fair, the authors do allude to the potential of ‘good
intergovernmentalism’ by using the term ‘intermediated legitimation’, implying that
legitimation in this way is indeed possible.
Optimistic or pessimistic visions left aside, this is a great book definitively worth
reading and discussing.
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